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The Fate of Universalism in Global Insolvency:
Neoconservatism and New Horizons
ERIC SOKOL
Abstract
Recent cases in the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia have
all signaled that international insolvency law is slowly losing traction to
more regional proceedings. This can have huge ramifications for creditors
of international companies. The past decade has seen much international
progress in business insolvencies; with the previous “territorialist” models
of regional dismantling giving way to more “universalist” approaches. New
trends in these large jurisdictions may herald the discovery of modified
universalism’s breaking point, but not its diminishment nor defeat. This
healthy prognosis for modified universalism in the U.S., United Kingdom
(U.K.), and Australia is further bolstered by a proliferation of new and
exciting universalist tendencies in jurisdictions around the world.
I. Introduction
It has been written that “no aspect of human endeavor is more clearly
global than commerce and investment and no part of commercial law has
been more in the forefront of international cooperation than the law of
insolvency.”1 Corporate bankruptcy (also sometimes called corporate
“insolvency”) 2 is a method by which debtor companies can keep creditors
from enforcing some or all of their claims during a period of reorganization
or liquidation.3 Creditors also benefit from a more ordered enforcement of

1. Jay Lawrence Westbrook,Interpretation Internationale, 87 TEMP. L. REV. 739, 740
(2015) [hereinafter Interpretation Internationale].
2. See, e.g., Sandeep Gopalan & Michael Guihot, Recognition and Enforcement in
Cross-Border Insolvency Law: A Proposal for Judicial Gap-Filling, 48 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L
L. 1225, 1235 (2015); Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Comity and Choice of Law in Global
Insolvencies, 54 TEX. INT’L L.J. 259, 260 (2019) [hereinafter Comity and Choice of Law]. But
cf., Soheyla Kefayati & Mehdi Ashouri, International Bankruptcy with an Emphasis on Trade
Bill Approved in 2013, 10 J. POL. & L. 1, 2 (2017) (stating the Iranian bankruptcy regime is
for businessmen and corporations while the insolvency regime is for all others).
3. See, e.g., Bankruptcy, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
39
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claims, which staves off “a creditor race”4 that could leave an unwary lender
empty-handed. When an ailing company must file for bankruptcy in more
than one court system, it is known as a “cross-border insolvency.”5 Despite
the term’s suggestion, planetary stays of creditor collection are not yet
available6 and “there is no super-national bankruptcy law.”7
Instead of such a global system, corporate bankruptcy law is usually
thought of as two competing schools of thought: territorialism and
universalism.8 These two schools coalesce into a third, known as modified
universalism.9 Though these three terms have applications outside of
bankruptcy law, this Comment will use them exclusively in their bankruptcy
context. Territorialism, universalism, and modified universalism will be
discussed below in Part I.
In 1997, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL) released its Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (Model
Law).10 As of the time of this publishing, the Model Law has been adopted
by forty-seven countries on six continents.11 The related UNCITRAL Model
Law on Recognition and Enforcement of Insolvency-Related Judgments
(Model Enforcement Law) was subsequently released in 201812 and is
designed to “provide [s]tates with a simple, straightforward and harmonized
procedure for recognition and enforcement of insolvency-related

4. Andrew B. Dawson, The Problem of Local Methods in Cross-Border Insolvencies,
12 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 45, 50 (2015).
5. E.g., Xenia Kler, COMI Comity: International Standardization of COMI Factors
Needed to Avoid Inconsistent Application Within Cross-Border Insolvency Cases, 34 AM. U.
INT’L L. REV. 429, 431 (2018).
6. See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Global Insolvency Proceedings for a Global Market:
The Universalist System and the Choice of a Central Court, 96 TEX. L. REV. 1473, 1479
(2018) [hereinafter Global Insolvency Proceedings].
7. Dawson, supra note 4, at 50.
8. See, e.g., Jonathan C. Gordon, Crossing the Line in Cross-Border Insolvencies, 27
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 17, 21 (2019).
9. See, e.g., Lia Metreveli, Toward Standardized Enforcement of Cross-Border
Insolvency Decisions: Encouraging the United States to Adopt UNCITRAL’s Recent
Amendment to Its Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, 51 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS.
315, 316 (2017); Dawson, supra note 4, at 53.
10. U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (May
30, 1997), https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts/insolvency/modellaw/cross-border_insolvency (last
visited Dec. 15, 2019).
11. U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Overview of the Status of UNCITRAL
Conventions and Model Laws (Nov. 15, 2016), https://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/
TAC/Status/Overview-Status-Table.pdf (last visited Dec. 15, 2019).
12. U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, UNCITRAL Model Law on Recognition and
Enforcement of Insolvency-Related Judgments (July 2, 2018), https://uncitral.un.org/
en/texts/insolvency/modellaw/mlij (last visited Dec. 15, 2019).
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judgments.”13 An effort similar to that of UNCITRAL has been undertaken
by the Judicial Insolvency Network (JIN). JIN has promulgated the
Guidelines for Communication and Cooperation Between Courts in CrossBorder Insolvency Matters (Guidelines).14 The Guidelines address issues
regarding inter-judicial communication,15 and have gained at least unofficial
acceptance in parts of the United States (U.S.), Singapore, Canada, and
more.16 The Model Law, Model Enforcement Law, and JIN Guidelines will
be discussed below in Part II.
Even with broad acceptance of the Model Law,17 as well as the release
of the yet-to-be-tested Model Enforcement Law18 and JIN Guidelines,19
some scholarly literature has recently argued that universalism no longer
seems to be on a trajectory towards global acceptance. 20 In the last decade,
court decisions in the U.S., U.K., and Australia have been cited as examples
of the respective court systems casting off a previous universalist tendency
and instead exhibiting characteristics that are distinctly territorialist;
including such actions as denying recognition of foreign main proceedings,
refusing to enforce judgments from foreign bankruptcy courts, refusing to
apply the foreign main proceeding’s substantive law, and other such judicial
determinations that generally prefer treatment of local creditors over foreign
ones. These cases and arguments will be summarized below in Part III.
In stating universalism as having suffered a major setback, the
pessimistic literature too hastily discounts the numerous other proceedings
around the world that validate many modified universalist victories. These
victories are in large jurisdictions, such as Singapore, India, and Iran, as well
13. Id.
14. Judicial Insolvency Network, Guidelines for Communication and Cooperation
Between Courts in Cross-Border Insolvency Matters (Oct. 11, 2016) http://www.jinglobal.org/jin-guidelines.html [hereinafter JIN Guidelines] (last visited Dec. 15, 2019).
15. See generally, Paul H. Zumbro & Omid H. Nasab, Two Is Company, but Three Is a
(Better) Crowd: The Southern District of New York Joins Delaware and Singapore in
Adopting Cross-Border Insolvency Guidelines, 11 INSOLVENCY & RESTRUCTURING INT’L 21
(2017).
16. JIN Guidelines, supra note 14.
17. See, e.g., John A. E. Pottow, The Dialogic Aspect of Soft Law in International
Insolvency: Discord, Digression, and Development, 40 MICH. J. INT’L L. 479, 484 (2019)
(“Moreover, the adoption rate of the [Model Law] rate of adoption has been . . . relatively
impressive in terms of its breadth.”).
18. See Varoon Sachdev, Choice of Law in Insolvency Proceedings: How English
Courts’ Continued Reliance on the Gibbs Principle Threatens Universalism, 93 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 343, 349 (2019).
19. E.g., JIN Guidelines, supra note 14.
20. See Adrian Walters, Modified Universalisms & the Role of Local Legal Culture in
the Making of Cross-Border Insolvency Law, 93 AM. BANKR. L.J. 47, 78 (2019) (“The
divergence between the [U.S. and U.K.] systems . . . present[s] challenges for universalism’s
harmonization agenda.”).
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as some smaller countries also herein addressed. The victories reflect large
systemic shifts in each mentioned jurisdiction. These shifts toward
universalism are discussed below in Part IV.
Part V is a brief survey of continued territorialism in certain
jurisdictions. Though not explored in-depth in this Comment, this author
notes it can also be argued that a lack of positive universalist strides is itself
a victory for the otherwise natural state of territorialism.
This Comment argues that the recent global universalist victories vastly
overshadow the slight setbacks the theory’s application has experienced in
U.S., U.K., and Australian law that are arguably territorialist and reflect
conservative lack of international comity. Taken as a whole, this Comment
stands for the proposition that the world is moving ever closer to a unified
playing field for international corporate creditors and debtors alike.
II. Territorialism, Universalism, and Modified Universalism
The argument between territorialism and universalism has been
described as “a long-standing scholarly debate”21 between what is essentially
“two broad extreme dichotomies.”22 Both of these two extremes find
temperance in a middle ground known as modified universalism. The
current opinion in legal scholarly writing is that “[m]odified universalism
still seems to be where ‘it’s at’ . . . .”23 This statement has been refuted by
those that point to recent decisions in the U.S. that could “render global
management of a global insolvency nearly impossible,”24 and decisions in
the U.K. that essentially require those “seeking to alter an English law
contract” to do so by going to jolly old England themselves.25
Some authors have argued that judicial actions that satisfy local
interests should be classified “crudely as ‘territorialist’”26 and the opposite
actions as universalist. This thinking has its drawbacks. It can even give
professional discussions a moral tinge in regular practice.27 This can be
somewhat appropriate, however, because the choice of insolvency system a
government elects has drastic impacts for debtors and for creditors to entities
that operate in that country which may potentially become insolvent in the
21. Fabio Weinberg Crocco, When Deference Makes a Difference: The Role of U.S.
Courts in Cross-Border Bankruptcies, 28 NORTON J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. (2019).
22. Gerard McCormack & Wan Wai Yee, The UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border
Insolvency Comes of Age: New Times or New Paradigms?, 54 TEX. INT’L L.J. 273, 276 (2019).
23. Ian G. Williams & Adrian J. Walters, Modified Universalism in Our Time? A Look
at Two Recent Cases in the U.S. and U.K., 37 AM. BANKR. INST. J., 24, 52 (2018).
24. Comity and Choice of Law, supra note 2, at 262.
25. Comity and Choice of Law, supra note 2, at 270.
26. Walters, supra note 20, at 71.
27. Id.
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future. To better understand these issues, it will be helpful to understand the
concepts of territorialism, universalism, and modified universalism.
A. Territorialism
Territorialism is sometimes known as the “grab rule”28 and is a
bankruptcy scheme in which each jurisdiction requires its own bankruptcy
proceeding over the entirety of the assets that the debtor has located in that
jurisdiction.29 The necessity of many different proceedings leads to many
inefficiencies in the process.30
Some of the main problems that present themselves in a territorialist
regime are: increased costs, “disparate treatment of similar creditors,” and a
high level of necessary creditor cooperation.31 Because of these difficulties,
creditors without a local presence can have a more difficult task collecting
in a jurisdiction remote to them.
These disadvantages are moderately offset by the advantages of
simplicity, predictability, clarity, and avoidance.32 It must be noted that these
advantages of territorialism are only true when viewed through the eyes of
the local creditor.33 Recent literature suggests that maintaining a territorialist
attitude may also benefit local bankruptcy practitioners.34
B. Universalism
Universalism can be thought of as a system in which bankruptcies
involve “unified global proceedings, administered by one principal court
under a single governing law, but potentially with the assistance of courts in
other jurisdictions. Assets located in ‘secondary jurisdictions’ are either
transferred to the main one or simply subject to the same bankruptcy regime
. . . .”35 The area in which the main bankruptcy proceeding takes place in
universalism is often referred to as the entity’s center of main interests

28. E.g., Gopalan et al., supra note 2, at 1267; Comity and Choice of Law, supra note 2,
at 263.
29. See, e.g., Crocco, supra note 21; Dawson, supra note 4, at 52; Metreveli, supra note
9, at 320.
30. See Gopalan et al., supra note 2, at 1228.
31. Metreveli, supra note 9, at 320-21.
32. See Metreveli, supra note 9, at 320.
33. See Metreveli, supra note 9, at 316.
34. See Williams et al., supra note 23, at 25 (“Maintaining the territorialist proposition
. . . could turn out to be an important focus for professionals on both sides of the pond.”).
35. Crocco, supra note 21 (footnotes omitted).

2 - Sokol HICLR 44-1 (Do Not Delete)

44

12/7/2020 8:39 AM

Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 44:1

(COMI).36 In pure universalism, the COMI court would be in charge of the
entirety of the bankruptcy on a “worldwide basis.”37
One of the big criticisms of universalism is there is no way for it to be
instituted without either “a comprehensive insolvency convention or global
courts and centralized enforcement mechanisms.”38 This leads some to
conclude that universalism “is detached from reality”39 and that a global legal
regime replacing a nation’s own may be too big an issue for some countries.40
Also, COMI disputes can arguably lead to forum shopping among the
different jurisdictions by a company moving its assets in anticipation of
filing soon after in the relocation jurisdiction.41
Despite these criticisms, “[m]ovement towards the internationalization
of private international law has been apparent from some time . . .”42 and
“[t]he majority of scholars agree that, at least in theory, universalism is the
most efficient approach to dealing with international insolvencies.”43
The advantages of universalism include eliminating costs by only
having one set of proceedings, minimizing “disparate treatment of creditors”
from inside and outside the COMI jurisdiction, facilitating information
sharing, and helping enable reorganizations.44 While any actual practicing
form of pure universalism is not yet apparent, proponents have yet to be
proven wrong in their assertion that “[o]nly in a single proceeding can all
assets be assembled to be sold or recapitalized free of prior claims and value
allocated fairly to all stakeholders.”45
C. Modified Universalism
Modified universalism is a combination of both territorialism and
universalism,46 that involves a main proceeding in the entity’s COMI as well
as each participating nation’s ability to determine whether or not to “defer to
the law applicable in the main proceeding” in certain instances.47 This added

36.
37.

See, e.g., Gopalan et al., supra note 2, at 1267; Metreveli, supra note 9, at 321.
TRANSNATIONAL INSOLVENCY: COOPERATION AMONG THE NAFTA COUNTRIES,
PRINCIPLES OF COOPERATION AMONG THE NAFTA COUNTRIES § II.A (AM. LAW INST. 2003).
38. Walters, supra note 20, at 49.
39. Dawson, supra note 4, at 51.
40. See Gopalan et al., supra note 2, at 1269; Metreveli, supra note 9, at 321.
41. See Metreveli, supra note 9, at 321.
42. Irit Mevorach, Modified Universalism as Customary International Law, 96 TEX. L.
REV. 1403, 1421 (2018).
43. Crocco, supra note 21.
44. Metreveli, supra note 9, at 321.
45. Global Insolvency Proceedings, supra note 6, at 1476.
46. See, e.g., Metreveli, supra note 9, at 316.
47. Walters, supra note 20, at 63; accord Dawson, supra note 4, at 53.
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“flexibility”48 comes with the caveat that it is still possible for “the laws of
the jurisdiction where the main proceeding is taking place [to] produce
extraterritorial effects . . . .”49
Modified universalism’s current manifestation also utilizes agents
known as foreign representatives to represent the main bankruptcy
proceeding at ancillary ones.50 These representatives use the ancillary court
for requests relating to discovery and injunctions,51 actions to stop (or
“avoid”) the collection of secured assets,52 and more.
Criticisms of modified universalism include the idea that modernized
states benefit from it more than burgeoning states do,53 in that it might
(among other things) frustrate local creditors’ expectations. This is possible,
in part, due to the nonexistence of any international common law
jurisprudence regarding modified universalism, or natural modes to enforce
international insolvency. 54 It is likely that local and foreign creditor’s
expectations would be more likely to be aligned if an international common
law regarding cross-border insolvency were to be acknowledged in the
future.
Another criticism of modified universalism is that it assumes that it is
the job of countries to reduce transactional friction, when this might not be
the overall ethos of the people of that state.55 As stated above, states each
make careful and unique calculations about how they want to balance
creditor rights with debtor ones.56 It is not given that an international
insolvency regime is something a state is prepared for, or wants.
If true universalism is a process of moving away from the natural
inclination towards territorialism, it seems that most jurisdictions in our
global world find themselves currently operating in the middle ground of
modified universalism. That said, “the status of modified universalism is
somewhat amorphous . . . .”57

48. Gopalan et al., supra note 1, at 1231.
49. Crocco, supra note 21.
50. See, e.g., Metreveli, supra note 9, at 323.
51. See id.
52. See, e.g., Gopalan et al., supra note 2, at 1264 (“Eurofinance . . . were “hit with
‘adversary proceedings’ in order to avoid and recover payments made to them.”); Lien
Avoidance, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
53. See Dawson, supra note 4, at 58; Walters, supra note 20, at 61-62.
54. See Mevorach, supra note 42, at 1416.
55. See Walters, supra note 20, at 61.
56. See, e.g., Jessica Nowak, The Power Struggle: Shareholder Rights in Brazilian
Corporate Bankruptcy, 25 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 339, 348 (2018).
57. Mevorach, supra note 42, at 1404-05.
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III. Model Law, Model Enforcement Law, and JIN Guidelines
Three of the current systems trying to make order out of this amorphism
are the Model Law, Model Enforcement Law, and the JIN Guidelines. While
this paper does not cover the intricacies of these three rule sets, a basic
understanding of them will help underscore their application in modern
modified and pure universalism theory.
A. Model Law
The Model Law is widely agreed to be an instrument of modified
universalism.58 The Model Law includes provisions intended to provide
“[a]ccess, [r]ecognition, [r]elief, and [sic] [c]ooperation and
[c]oordination.”59 These cross-border “soft law[s]”60 are the mechanism by
which foreign representatives can get a foreign main proceeding recognized,
obtain domestic stays on collections, and possibly obtain “discretionary
relief for both main and non-main proceedings post-recognition.”61
It has been written that “the Model Law facilitates the optimal
management of cross-border insolvency so as to benefit debtors, creditors,
and other stakeholders, as well as the economies in which these stakeholders
function.”62 The wide adoption of the rules is evidence that this is true.
The Model Law also has received criticisms, including that it does not
provide enough “predictability for creditors or debtors in relation to the
enforcement of insolvency judgments . . .”,63 it does not properly stress the
creditors’ expectations as a criteria for COMI determination,64 that the COMI
factors are “neither comprehensive nor uniform across U.S. and European
Courts[,]”65 that the differences in timing used to determine an entity’s
COMI can lead to forum shopping,66 and the Model Law soft law approach’s
slow speed allows for “uncertainty derived from inconsistent application and

58. See, e.g., Walters, supra note 20, at 64; McCormack et al., supra note 22, at 276;
Dawson, supra note 4, at 53; Gopalan et al., supra note 2, at 1231.
59. Metreveli, supra note 9, at 325; accord McCormack et al., supra note 22, at 276;
Walters, supra note 20, at 57-58.
60. McCormack et al., supra note 22, at 304; accord Walters, supra note 20, at 65. See
generally, Pottow, supra note 17.
61. Metreveli, supra note 9, at 325.
62. McCormack et al., supra note 22, at 275.
63. Gopalan et al., supra note 2, at 1266.
64. See Kler, supra note 5, at 434-35.
65. See Kler, supra note 5, at 447.
66. See Metreveli, supra note 9, at 321; Kler, supra note 5, at 440. But see Crocco, supra
note 21 (“[E]vidence . . . supports the claim that . . . forum shopping . . . is of limited practical
importance.”).
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interpretation . . .” in the meantime.67 While not herein discussed, it is
noteworthy that the European Union’s Insolvency Regulation (EIR)68 for
internal cross-border cases is very similar to the Model Law, except it
addresses the issue of a company’s COMI using creditor’s reasonable
expectations by taking into account where business activity occurs instead
of just where the entity is incorporated.69
B. Model Enforcement
One of the main problems with the Model Law has been addressed in
the Model Enforcement Law. “[T]he Model Law does not specifically deal
with the enforcement of judgments,”70 and “UNCITRAL has recently
attempted to respond to this inconsistency by promulgating the [Model
Enforcement Law].”71 The Model Enforcement Law is still very new, but
one article published while it was still just an amendment has argued it could
introduce “more stability into the world of international insolvency by
narrowing the range of judicial discretion and enumerating finite exceptions
through which enforcement and recognition can be denied.”72
Two of the main additions in the Model Enforcement Rules are in
Article X and Article 14. “Article X provides a mechanism to overturn
narrow interpretations of the Model Law by stating that the discretionary
relief available . . . ‘should be interpreted as including the recognition and
enforcement of a judgment, notwithstanding any interpretation to the
contrary.’”73 Article 14 offers a list of conditions “where a court may deny
recognition in Article 14, but the accompanying Draft Guide to Enactment
of the Model [Enforcement] Law . . . emphasizes that courts” may still honor
and enforce things not enumerated.74

67. Gopalan et al., supra note 2, at 1230.
68. See, e.g., European Commission, Insolvency proceedings, https://ec.europa.eu/info/
policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/civil-justice/civil-and-commercial-law/insolvencyproceedings_en (last visited Dec. 15, 2019).
69. See Kler, supra note 5, at 434-35.
70. Gopalan et al., supra note 2, at 1233.
71. Sachdev, supra note 18, at 349.
72. Metreveli, supra note 9, at 345.
73. Sachdev, supra note 18, at 372 (quoting MODEL LAW ON RECOGNITION AND
ENFORCEMENT OF INSOLVENCY-RELATED JUDGMENTS ART. X (U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade
Law 2018)).
74. Sachdev, supra note 18, at 372.
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C. JIN
Among other things, JIN facilitates “the establishment of personal
relationships among commercial judges from different countries.”75 The JIN
Guidelines do not directly compete with the UNCITRAL laws, but instead
“provide for the incorporation of protocols into court orders when there are
parallel proceedings affecting a debtor company or group.”76 The Guidelines
offer “the possibility of innovative practices such as joint hearings”77 and
their “drafters were focused primarily on the ability of the parties to be
present during any communication between courts on substantive matters
. . . .”78 The Guidelines separate communication between courts that
requires the presence of parties from that which was more procedural79 and
their accompanying documentation gives suggestions about recording and
preserving hearings.80
In February 2017, the Guidelines were implemented by Singapore,81
were instituted as local rules in Delaware, and were also adopted in the
Southern District of New York.82 Further, “[t]he Chancery Division of the
High Court of England [and] Wales adopted the Guidelines on [May 5,]
2017.”83 At a recent roundtable it was also stated that, in Ontario, “there was
a notice sent out to the insolvency community saying the court is expecting
to see these new [JIN G]uidelines used.”84
IV. Universalism’s Mixed Success in Key JXs
Even with the aforementioned three cross-border insolvency resources,
much “has been inconsistent and unpredictable” about cross-border

75. Global Insolvency Proceedings, supra note 6, at 1492-93.
76. Walters, supra note 20, at 109.
77. Id.
78. Zumbro et al., supra note 15, at 22.
79. See id.
80. Zumbro et al., supra note 15, at 22-23.
81. Press Release, Supreme Court of Singapore, Paving the Way for Improved
Coordination of Cross-Border Insolvency Proceedings: Adoption of the Guidelines for
Communication and Cooperation between Courts in Cross-Border Insolvency Matters (Feb.
1 2017) (on file with author).
82. See Zumbro et al., supra note 15, at 21.
83. Press Release, Supreme Court of Singapore, England and Wales—The latest to adopt
the Guidelines for Communication and Cooperation between Courts in Cross-Border
Insolvency Matters (May 11, 2017) (on file with author).
84. Ameneh Bordi, Scott Cousins, Andrea Hartley, Natalie Levine & James R. Risener
III, Corporate Bankruptcy Panel Chapter 15 Choice of Law: How Far Do I Need to Go to
Get My Money Back?, 35 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 345, 360 (2019).
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insolvency enforcement; even in states that have adopted the Model Law.85
It was recently stated:
[A] judge in New York must assume that a Chapter 11 confirmed at
Battery Park will fail to discharge any English-law contract obligations in
England, while a judge on Fetter Lane in London would logically expect a
substantial risk of the same in the United States as to a contract governed by
New York law.86
One possible general reason for these issues arising is that countries can
have very different “broad political outlook[s]” than one another.87 For this
reason, it is necessary to look to specific examples from key Model Law
states to better understand the current state of affairs.
A. United States
It has been said that “[t]he liberal fresh start for individuals in U.S.
bankruptcy law is ‘peculiarly American.’”88 Further, “[t]he United States
courts developed a strong cooperative jurisprudence through the quarter
century or so before [adopting] the Model Law.”89 The Model Law’s
American manifestation was codified in 2005 as Chapter 15 of the
Bankruptcy Code.90 Currently, Chapter 15 is “the governing statutory
scheme for U.S. cases ancillary to foreign [main] proceedings”91 and is
today’s “sole gateway for a U[.]S[.] court to provide assistance to a foreign
court; there is no residual common law discretion.”92 Also, “[t]he judicial
code [of the U.S.] limits the bankruptcy judge’s authority to enter final
judgments” to certain matters (known as “core” matters), unless both the
parties grant their consent.93
85. Metreveli, supra note 9, at 327.
86. Comity and Choice of Law, supra note 2, at 262.
87. McCormack et al., supra note 22, at 287.
88. Iain Ramsay, U.S. Exceptionalism, Historical Institutionalism, and the Comparative
Study of Consumer Bankruptcy Law, 87 TEMP. L. REV. 947, 947 (2015) (quoting MONICA
PRASAD, THE LAND OF TOO MUCH: AMERICAN ABUNDANCE AND THE PARADOX OF POVERTY
183 (2012)).
89. Interpretation Internationale, supra note 1, at 741.
90. See, e.g., Michael J. Venditto, The “Border Wall” in Chapter 15: Does § 1506
Prevent Foreign Law from Crossing the Border?, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Oct. 2017, at 22;
Hardy DeLaughter, Why Two Facets of Chapter 15 Rulings Hinder Cross-Border Insolvency
Petitions in the United States, 32 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 397, 402 (2016).
91. Alec P. Ostrow, Has Chapter 15 Bestowed on the Bankruptcy Court a Roving
Commission to Do Equity After a Foreign Proceeding Has Been Recognized?, 2019 NORTON
ANN. SURV. OF BANKR. L. (2019).
92. McCormack et al., supra note 22, at 291.
93. Martin E. Beeler, Recent Developments in Bankruptcy Jurisdiction, 2018 NORTON
ANN. SURV. OF BANKR. L. (2018).
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The natural inclination would be to assume that the U.S. has been on a
continuous trajectory towards more expansive universalism, but this is far
from the case. Recent U.S. case law suggests to many that “the U.S. courts
have interpreted Chapter 15 in ways that are inconsistent with the workings
and purposes of the Model Law,”94 or at least aspects of their application can
be “a bit skewed”95 and “present old situations with new complications.”96
Other authors have argued that these recent cases, discussed below, “do not
deviate from the prevailing American view” that international concessions
are to be made whenever possible97 and that denials happen only in a
minority of cases.98
There appears to be four main issues that have come up in the last
decade regarding U.S. courts and Chapter 15: issues with defining
appropriate relief, issues with deciding when and how to determine a
company’s COMI, issues with when to utilize the public policy exception to
recognition, and issues with the granting of non-debtor releases.
The first issue, U.S. interpretation of the term appropriate relief, has
been criticized as having “a lack of definitive standards . . .”99 that allows
judges to decide whether or not the edict of a foreign court comports with
the fairness necessary to be honored domestically.100 “Chapter 15 allots
automatic relief through 11 U.S.C. § 1520.5. Additionally, § 1521 grants a
bankruptcy court discretion to provide supplementary relief that may be
necessary to protect a debtor or its creditors.”101 The appropriate
discretionary relief has been criticized as being “one-sided, as it can only be
granted at the request of the foreign representative.”102 That said, current
literature has argued that courts have recently “ruled that the authority
granted under the ‘appropriate relief’ provision is broad and thus available
to override domestic legal doctrines . . . .”103 This arguably implies
discretion for a future court to grant requests made by those other than a
foreign representative.

94. Dawson, supra note 4, at 47; accord Metreveli, supra note 9, at 336.
95. Alec P. Ostrow, Situation Comity: Something Familiar, Something Peculiar, Nothing
That’s Formal, Nothing That’s Normal, 2018 NORTON ANN. SURV. OF BANKR. L. (2018).
96. Id.
97. Walters, supra note 20, at 90.
98. See Crocco, supra note 21 (“Empirical evidence suggests that U.S. bankruptcy courts
are generally cooperative and, in the vast majority of cases, grant both recognition petitions
and motions for discretionary relief.”).
99. Venditto, supra note 90, at 76.
100. See id.
101. DeLaughter, supra note 90, at 398 (footnote omitted).
102. Patricia B. Tomasco & Sara C. Clark, Heads I Win, Tails You Lose: Asymmetric
Discovery in Chapter 15, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Sept. 2019, at 27 (emphasis omitted).
103. Ostrow, supra note 91 (footnote omitted).
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The next issue, deciding when and how to determine a company’s
COMI, has yet to be addressed in U.S. statutes.104 This is an issue because a
determination that an order is not from a debtor’s COMI can “significantly
limit the scope of discovery that a foreign representative can seek . . . .”105
There have been large discrepancies in how differing jurisdictions in the U.S.
have dealt with this lack of insight.106 However, it has recently been stated
that “in the vast majority of cases, courts found that the foreign proceeding
was pending in the jurisdiction where the debtor had its COMI.”107 When
combined “with the high rate of recognitions of foreign proceedings, [this]
supports the claim that concerns about forum shopping and manipulation of
COMI, although relevant, is [sic] of limited practical importance.”108
Another issue is the criteria for use of the public policy exception,
which “authorizes the court to refuse to take action under Chapter 15 if it
would be ‘manifestly contrary to the public policy of the United States.’”109
In theory, “the public policy exception [should] be used narrowly and applied
only in ‘circumstances where a “fundamental policy” of the United States is
threatened.’”110 However, “[d]espite the seemingly compulsory language
. . . [the] public policy exception [] seemingly permits the bankruptcy court
to deny [] otherwise-mandated recognition.”111 One author also complained
about a U.S. court granting recognition to a case over allegations that the
foreign main proceeding was a “predatory corporate raid[],” which should
have triggered the public policy exception.112
The last large U.S. issue regards non-debtor (i.e. third-party) releases.
Courts “in the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Seventh, Eighth and Eleventh
Circuits” allow non-debtor releases in certain circumstances.113 “[T]he Fifth,
Ninth, Tenth, and the District of Columbia Circuits” have stated that non104. See Bordi et al., supra note 84, at 347.
105. Tomasco et al., supra note 102, at 27.
106. See, e.g., Kler, supra note 5, at 438; DeLaughter, supra note 90, at 412. See generally
Gopalan et al., supra note 2, at 1250 (reciting COMI determination factors used in another
U.S. case).
107. Crocco, supra note 21.
108. Id.
109. Gopalan et al., supra note 2, at 1250 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 1506).
110. Metreveli, supra note 9, at 336 (quoting Kevin P. Ray, Ch. 15 and Public Policy
Lessons from Jaffe v. Samsung, LAW 360 (Mar. 21, 2014, 12:36 AM), http://www.law360.co
m/articles/520171/ch-15-and-public-policy-lessons-from-jaffe-v-samsung; accord Ostrow,
supra note 91.
111. Venditto, supra note 90, at 23; accord Metreveli, supra note 9, at 336.
112. See D. Farrington Yates, George V. Utlik, Daniel J. Saval & Adam M. Lavine,
Coming to America: Alleged Predatory Corporate Raiding Makes Landfall in the United
States through Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code, 12 INSOLVENCY & RESTRUCTURING INT’L
17, 18 (2018).
113. Beeler, supra note 93.
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debtor releases are barred.114 The resulting circuit split115 has left things in a
state of confusion that the Supreme Court has yet to address.116
One other minor issue is the inability to remove a foreign
representative, as it would “likely lead to dismissal” and is “a draconian
sanction that courts have cautioned against.”117 Also, fining the foreign
representative would be similarly punitive on a debtor who “has agreed to
some kind of indemnification[.]”118 Ergo, any punishment is likely to be
unfairly passed on.
These issues have come up in a number of different U.S. cases. In this
author’s opinion, the relevant literature of the 2010’s U.S. can be divided in
three main eras: the first with movement towards universalism, the next with
a contraction towards territorialism, and the third with signs of a reversal
towards a more universalist outlook.
At the beginning of the decade, the literature states cases like In re
Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investment (Metcalfe)119 seemed to herald
signs of continued or even increased deference to foreign main
proceedings.120 In Metcalfe, the U.S. court chose to honor a Canadian
foreign main proceeding’s restructuring plan. The plan resulted in different
outcomes for U.S. creditors,121 however the court decided that the public
policy exception in Chapter 15 was not applicable due to the use of similar
insolvency methods.122
The first case indicating the U.S. territorialist turn was In re Vitro S.A.B.
de CV;123 which involved a “hotly contested plan from the one voting class
of creditors . . . achieved through the counting of votes from ‘insiders’ (i.e.,
50 percent of all voting claims were held by intercompany debtholders)
. . . .”124 The court decided that, at least in this instance, “non-debtor
discharges were generally unavailable” to those in the U.S., and were not
114. In re Avanti Commc’ns. Grp. PLC, 582 B.R. 603, 606 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2018).
115. See, e.g., Gerald C. Bender, Giorgio Bovenzi & Oscar N. Pinkas, Scheme of
Arrangement Confirming Nonconsensual Third-Party Releases Approved in Chapter 15s,
AM. BANKR. INST. J., Dec. 2018, at 34; Pierce G. Hand, IV, The Eleventh Circuit’s Second
Shot at Getting It Right: Nonconsensual Nondebtor Releases in Bankruptcy Court, 15
DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 107, 108 (2017).
116. Hand, supra note 115, at 108.
117. Gordon, supra note 8, at 38.
118. Gordon, supra note 8, at 39.
119. In re Metcalfe & Mansfield Alt. Invs., 421 B.R. 685 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 2010).
120. See, e.g., Metreveli, supra note 9, at 336-37 (stating a New York court cited to
principles of comity and “modified universalism” in its decision to enforce a foreign
restructuring plan).
121. See Metreveli, supra note 9, at 336-37.
122. See Gopalan et al., supra note 2, at 1255-56.
123. In re Vitro S.A.B. de CV, 701 F.3d 1031 (5th Cir. 2012).
124. Bender et al., supra note 115, at 35.
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“appropriate relief.”125 This is arguably an “expansive interpretation” of the
public policy exception.126 That stated,most of the current literature argues
that the case was an exception borne out of the impropriety of the approved
voting plan.127
A second case that reinforced the return of territorialism was Jaffé v.
Samsung Electronics.128 Therein, the court “held that granting [a] German
liquidator’s request to terminate U.S. patent licenses would slow the pace of
innovation and undermine the U.S. economy . . .” and was therefore against
public policy.129 The appeals court subsequently affirmed on the different
grounds of insufficient protection for local interests.130 There is some
argument that this was, again, an exception to the usual comity displayed by
the U.S. at the time.131
Two 2017 cases, In re Arcapita Bank B.S.C. (Arcapita)132 and In re
SunEdison, Inc. (SunEdison),133 both have territorialist aspects. In Arcapita,
the court decided to keep funds transferred “between New York banks, [even
though] the defendants made the placement investments at issue overseas[]
in London or Bahrain[,]”134 and that doing so was “to the exclusion of [the
parties’] legitimate expectations in the circumstances of an insolvency of a
Bahraini entity with whom the relevant contracts were made under Bahraini
law.”135 The second 2017 case, SunEdison, resulted in the court holding an
“ipso facto clause gave the U.S. debtor the right to terminate the contract and
reclaim [an intellectual property] grant despite the provision of Korean
bankruptcy law that made such a clause unenforceable against the Korean
debtor.”136 These two cases arguably point to a territorialist contraction in
U.S. case law.

125. Gopalan et al., supra note 2, at 1259.
126. Metreveli, supra note 9, at 340.
127. See Bender et al., supra note 115, at 35; see also Walters, supra note 20, at 90 (“Vitro
do[es] not significantly deviate from the prevailing American view that comity is the
animating norm . . . .”).
128. Jaffé v. Samsung Elecs., 737 F.3d 14 (4th Cir. 2013).
129. Metreveli, supra note 9, at 338.
130. See Metreveli, supra note 9, at 338-39; Gopalan et al., supra note 2, at 1256.
131. See Walters, supra note 20, at 90.
132. In re Arcapita Bank B.S.C., 575 B.R. 229 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2017).
133. In re SunEdison, Inc., 577 B.R. 120 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2017).
134. Ostrow, supra note 95; accord Richard J. Mason & Karyn D. Heavenrich, More
Mixed Signals on the Extraterritorial Reach of US Avoiding Powers, 12 INSOLVENCY &
RESTRUCTURING INT’L 10, 12 (2018).
135. Ostrow, supra note 95.
136. Comity and Choice of Law, supra note 2, at 261; see also Williams et al., supra note
23, at 25 (“However, a recent case . . . seemed to turn against the tide of U.S. thinking . . . .”).
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The most recent literature points to a third era beginning. In re Avanti
Communications Group PLC (Avanti)137 has been touted as a good example
that universalism is making a U.S. comeback.138 There, a U.S. court
recognized a U.K. third-party release, and stated “that schemes of
arrangements sanctioned under UK [sic] law that provide third-party nondebtor guarantor releases should be recognized and enforced . . . “ provided
the underlying voting was fair.139 The case was distinguished from Vitro “on
the basis that the debtor’s scheme had ‘near unanimous support . . . .’”140 In
2018, the Southern District of New York further embraced universalism in
In re B.C.I. Finances Pty [sic] Limited141 and In re Agrokor D.D., et. al.142
“More than 14 years on, chapter 15 [sic] remains relatively
underutilized[,]”143 but “U.S. courts have been successful in establishing a
pragmatic and effective modified universalist bankruptcy regime.”144
B. United Kingdom
The U.K. has a very different insolvency history than the U.S. For
example, imprisonment for consumer debts was only abolished in the U.K.
in 1970.145 Further, there is some contention about the exact number of
insolvency regimes in the U.K.146 In the U.K. “[e]arly cases after the
adoption of the Model Law . . . applied the CBIR [the U.K. adoption of the
Model Law] according to modified universalist principles.”147 First, in
Cambridge Gas Transport Corporation v. Official Committee of Unsecured

137. In re Avanti Commc’ns. Grp. PLC, 582 B.R. 603, 618 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2018).
138. See, e.g., Bender et al., supra note 115, at 34 (observing that “hand-wringing” with
regard to non-debtor releases would become unnecessary after the Arcapita decision).
139. In re Avanti Commc’ns. Grp. PLC, 582 B.R. at 618.
140. Crocco, supra note 21 (quoting In re Avanti Commc’ns. Grp. PLC, 582 B.R. at 618).
141. In re B.C.I. Fins. Pty [sic] Ltd., 583 B.R. 288, 297 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2018) (holding
that Australian substantive law would govern the New York case).
142. In re Agrokor d.d., et al., 591 B.R. 163, 169 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2018) (honoring thirdparty debtor releases issued in Croatian foreign main proceeding).
143. Tomasco et al., supra note 102, at 26; see also Crocco, supra note 21 (“[D]ata
suggests that there has not been constant or meaningful growth in the rate of Chapter 15 filings
in the United States.”).
144. Crocco, supra note 21.
145. See Ramsay, supra note 88, at 966.
146. See, e.g., Walters, supra note 20, at 79-80 (“Indeed, U.K. cross-border insolvency
law is better thought of as being like a building with four rooms . . . .”); Gopalan et al.,
supra note 2, at 1259 (“The United Kingdom has six potential legal regimes that operate in
cross-border insolvency situations.”); McCormack et al., supra note 22, at 291 (“[T]here are
three statutory vehicles for international/cross-border cooperation in [U.K.] insolvency
matters . . . .”).
147. Metreveli, supra note 9, at 327-28.
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Creditors of Navigator Holdings, PLC (Cambridge Gas),148 the court held
that it could honor an Isle of Man bankruptcy plan “under its common law
powers of assistance . . .”149 and that “fairness requires insolvency
proceedings to have universal application.”150 In In re HIH Casualty &
General Insurance Limited (In re HIH),151 it was determined upon appeal
that the common law should be included as an option in U.K. cross-border
insolvency.152 It was noted that “[c]reditors’ expectations formed part of the
justification for the court’s holding . . . .”153
This universalist era did not last long. The oft-cited first case of the
countertrend was Rubin v. Eurofinance SA (Rubin),154 wherein the U.K court
system “took a severe local turn, explicitly disavowing Cambridge Gas” and
not honoring a U.S. judgment.155 Rubin has been described as “a turf war
about the scope of U.K. cross-border insolvency law as a whole.”156 The
Rubin court ultimately refused to honor a third-party judgment because thirdparties’ rights are not enumerated in the Model Law nor CBIR157 and doing
so was found to be something that ought be left to the legislature.158 The
court “merely bristled at the idea” of choosing the U.S. approach to similar
situations.159
In the years since Rubin there have been a few small victories for
universalism,160 however cases such as Fibria Celulose S/A v. Pan Ocean Co
Ltd (Pan Ocean)161 and Bakhshiyeva ex rel. International Bank of Azerbaijan

148. Cambridge Gas Transp. Corp. v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (of
Navigator Holdings PLC and others) [2006] UKPC 26, [2007] 1 AC 508 (PC) (appeal taken
from Isle of Man).
149. Walters, supra note 20, at 100.
150. Metreveli, supra note 9, at 329.
151. McGrath v. Riddell (In re HIH Cas. & Gen. Ins. Ltd.) [2008] UKHL 21 (appeal taken
from UK).
152. See Gopalan et al., supra note 2, at 1263.
153. Metreveli, supra note 9, at 330.
154. Rubin v. Eurofinance SA [2012] UKSC 46, [2013] 1 AC 236 (appeal taken from
Eng.).
155. Interpretation Internationale, supra note 1, at 746; see also Metreveli, supra note 9,
at 331 (“[Rubin] diverg[ed] from previous decisions”). But cf. Walters, supra note 20, at 102
(“Any suggestion that Rubin is an abandonment of modified universalism is overblown.”).
156. Walters, supra note 20, at 96.
157. See Sachdev, supra note 18, at 359 (quoting Rubin, [2012] UKSC 46 at [142]).
158. See Metreveli, supra note 9, at 331-32.
159. Pottow, supra note 17, at 485.
160. See, e.g., McCormack et al., supra note 22, at 289 (“[T]he court may [currently]
recognize, under the UK [sic] version of the Model Law, Croatian insolvency proceedings . . . .”).
161. Fibria Celulose S/A v. Pan Ocean Co. Ltd. [2014] EWHC (Ch) 2124, [2014] Bus LR
1041 (UK).
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v. Sberbank of Russia (I.B.A.)162 have proven that territorialism has taken
stronger hold in the U.K. than in here stateside. In Pan Ocean, the U.K.
court solidified that U.K. courts could not grant relief which was not
available to domestic English debtors.163 In I.B.A., this attitude was again
upheld,164 but the case is currently in the process of appeal.165 This leaves
U.K. insolvency law drifting towards territorialism, as does the recent
conservative political victory in the country.166
C. Australia
Australia is the other large Model Law jurisdiction with moderate
coverage in American legal literature. Australia adopted the Model Law in
2008,167 and the two main cases that have been cited in regards cross-border
insolvency are Ackers v Saad Investment Company Limited (Ackers),168 and
Yu v. STX Pan Ocean Company (Yu).169 In Ackers, an Australian tax court
decided to keep the amount of tax debt it would have received if counted in
a Cayman Island proceeding (that would not have counted it, nor given it
anything back).170 In Yu, the Australian court allowed a maritime lienholder
to move forward on vessels that were part of a foreign insolvency
proceeding.171 Australia’s choice to do so has been criticized as being “for
the benefit of local creditors . . .”172 and reflecting “the reluctance of

162. Bakhshiyeva ex rel. Int’l Bank of Azerbaijan v. Sberbank of Russia [2018] EWHC
(Ch) 59, aff’d, [2018] EWCA Civ 2802 (UK).
163. See Walters, supra note 20, at 99.
164. See Comity and Choice of Law, supra note 2, at 270.
165. Sachdev, supra note 18, at 375.
166. See generally, Guy Faulconbridge & William James, Britain speeds towards Brexit
as Johnson wins large majority in election, REUTERS WORLD NEWS, (Dec. 12, 2019, 2:05
PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-election/britain-speeds-towards-brexit-asjohnson-wins-large-majority-in-election-idUSKBN1YG2O5.
167. Michael Murray & Rosalind Mason, Model Law on Cross-border Insolvency Exclusion of Australian Banks, 20 AUSTL. INSOLVENCY J., no. 4, 2008, at 4, https://www.insol.
org/emailer/jan2009_downloads/Australia-UNCITRAL_Model%20Law.pdf (last viewed
Dec. 15, 2019).
168. Ackers v Saad Invs Co Ltd (2010) 190 FCR 285 (Austl.).
169. Yu v STX Pan Ocean Co (2013) 223 FCR 189 (Austl.).
170. See Metreveli, supra note 9, at 333-34; see also Gopalan et al., supra note 2, at 1243
(“Australia [kept] up to the pari passu amount . . . [they] would be entitled to receive as a
dividend were [they] entitled to be admitted . . .” (quoting Akers v Saad Inves Co Ltd, [2013]
FCA 738 [53] (Austl.))).
171. Martin Davies, Cross-Border Insolvency and Admiralty: A Middle Path of
Reciprocal Comity, 66 AM. J. COMP. L. 101, 112 (2018).
172. Metreveli, supra note 9, at 335.
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Australian courts to apply modified universalist principles . . . .”173
Territorialism would seem to be winning “Down Under.”
V. Universalist Success in Other Jurisdictions
Despite the successes of territorialism (or failures of universalism),
especially in the U.K. and Australia, the world has many other jurisdictions
that are opening their borders to more expansive creditors’ rights regimes
and options. Some are even taking their first ever international insolvency
steps. It cannot be overstated how drastic a change this can entail for a state.
A. Singapore
Singapore adopted the JIN Guidelines in 2017.174 It also adopted the
Model Law the same year,175 and it has stated officially that one of the
reasons for adoption was to “influence foreign investment in Singapore
favorably.”176 The previous year, Singapore courts made pro-universalist
decisions in both Re Opti-Medix Ltd (Opti-Medix)177and Re Gulf Pacific
Shipping Ltd (Gulf Pacific).178 In Opti-Medix, the Singaporean court
“focused on COMI-type factors for choosing a central court rather than the
old incorporation doctrine.”179 This aligns them with the arguably morerefined EIR mode of cross-border insolvency. In Gulf Pacific, Singapore
“recognize[d] the appointment of liquidators over [the] Hong Kong shipping
company . . . despite being in out-of-court proceedings regarding which the
domestic powers of assistance were constrained.”180 Singapore appears to
be becoming a vanguard of universalism.

173. Id.
174. Press Release, Supreme Court of Singapore, Paving the Way for Improved
Coordination of Cross-Border Insolvency Proceedings: Adoption of the Guidelines for
Communication and Cooperation between Courts in Cross-Border Insolvency Matters (Feb.
1, 2017) (on file with author).
175. Press Release, United Nations Information Services (UNIS) Vienna, Singapore
enacts legislation implementing UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (Mar.
16, 2017) (on file with author).
176. McCormack et al., supra note 22, at 282 (quoting INSOLVENCY LAW REVIEW
COMMITTEE, MINISTRY OF LAW, LAW REVIEW COMMITTEE: FINAL REPORT (Sing. 2013),
https://www.mlaw.gov.sg/files/news/announcements/2013/10/ReportoftheInsolvencyLawRe
viewCommittee.pdf).
177. Re Opti-Medix Ltd. [2016] SGHC 108 (Sing.).
178. Re Gulf Pac. Shipping Ltd. [2016] SGHC 287 (Sing.).
179. Global Insolvency Proceedings, supra note 6, at 1482-83 (footnote omitted).
180. Mevorach, supra note 42, at 1433 (footnote omitted).
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B. India
In May of 2016, India passed “an overhaul of the insolvency and
bankruptcy scheme.”181 The new rules shift the process “away from a
debtor-in-possession model, to a model where creditors decide on the
resolution while an impartial professional” is put in charge.182 The new law
will also hopefully allow unsecured creditors better legal avenues.183 While
“[t]he Supreme Court . . . has hailed the Code to be a ‘creditor-friendly’
law[,]”184 there have been complaints that the new laws are too creditorfriendly.185 Also, “the Ministry of Corporate Affairs, on June 20, 2018[,]
issued a public notice . . . inviting comments and suggestions on the draft
chapter on cross border [sic] insolvency it plans to introduce . . . based on
the [UNCITRAL] Model Law on Cross Border Insolvency.”186 However, it
has been otherwise argued that India has “remained resistant” to the Model
Law,187 ergo, universalism.
C. Other Jurisdictions
In 2013, Iran approved a trade bill that refers “explicitly and extensively
to international bankruptcy.”188 The bill purportedly addresses creditor
accessibility, “recognition of foreign proceedings, . . . judicial cooperation,
and simultaneous proceedings.”189 However, the proceedings are still
conducted exclusively using local applicable law190 or treaties,191 and
bankruptcy is punishable by up to six years in prison.192 This is still good
incremental progress.

181. Sreyan Chatterjee, Gausia Shaikh & Bhargavi Zaveri, An Empirical Analysis of the
Early Days of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, 30 NAT’L L. SCH. INDIA REV. 89,
89 (2018).
182. Id. at 90.
183. See id. at 97.
184. Sahil Kanuga & Arjun Gupta, Guarantors under Bankruptcy Code: The Curious
Case of Confusing Precedents, 12 INSOLVENCY & RESTRUCTURING INT’L 19, 23 (2018).
185. See generally Navin K. Pahwa, Corporate Insolvency: Its Operations and Emerging
Problems, 30 NAT’L L. SCH. INDIA Rev. 111, 118 (2018).
186. Ran Chakrabarti, Key Issues in Cross-Border Insolvency, 30 NAT’L L. SCH. INDIA
REV. 119, 121 (2018).
187. McCormack et al., supra note 22, at 274.
188. Kefayati et al., supra note 2, at 1.
189. Id.
190. See Kefayati et al., supra note 2, at 6.
191. See Kefayati et al., supra note 2, at 4.
192. TA’ZIR [DETERRING PUNISHMENTS, BOOK FIVE OF ISLAMIC PENAL CODE] Tehran
1996, arts. 670-71 (Iran).
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In 2016, the Bahamas published new legislation “allow[ing] courtappointed representatives to be recognized” by a list of 142 countries.193 The
Bahamas still will not honor orders regarding secured creditors, and also
retains the right to utilize a public policy exception.194 Here, the unsecured
creditors will benefit more from the added universalism traits.
Mexico decided to address issues such as the voting abuse in Vitro,
discussed above, by a reformation of its “Ley de Concursos Mercantiles
[bankruptcy laws] in 2014 in an attempt to further modernize its bankruptcy
proceedings.”195 Mexico’s previous cross-border insolvency regime has
been referred to as “an almost medieval system that strongly favoured [sic]
the family owners of companies.”196 The two main issues that have been
noted in the new system are that creditors can opt out of reorganization plans
with which they disagree,197 and reorganizations are made more difficult by
the automatic switch to a liquidation proceeding after one year.198 The new
system is still progress and an acknowledgement that change was (and likely
still is) needed.
The United Arab Emirates promulgated a new bankruptcy law in 2016
which, among other things, repeals the criminal laws regarding
bankruptcy.199 One article states that the country enacted the law in hopes it
will have a “positive impact on the UAE as a conducive financial market for
international investors.”200 Under the new regime managers trade risk of
imprisonment for joint liability, which the article’s author states is hoped to
discourage the previous method of liability avoidance; to “opt for
absconding from UAE.”201 International soft law instruments like the Model
Law have likely influenced universalist shifts, such as this new regime.
A recent article states that Saudi Arabia has remodeled “its economic
endeavors to achieve an investment friendly [sic] atmosphere.”202 The
system now allows for creditor-initiated restructuring and involves the
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194. Id. at 40.
195. Richard J. Cooper, Adam Brenneman & Jessica E. McBride, A New World for LatAm
Creditors: Insolvency Reform in Latin America, 11 PRATT’S J. BANKR. L. 190, 193 (2015).
196. Joy Gallup, Mike Fitzgerald & Rodrigo Guaido Azar, A Step Backwards, 35 INT’L
FIN. L. REV. 50, 50 (2016).
197. See Cooper et al., supra note 195, at 194.
198. Cooper et al., supra note 195, at 193.
199. Minal Kaul, New Bankruptcy Law in the UAE, 5 CT. UNCOURT 5, 5 (2018).
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appointment of a trustee.203 One drawback of the system is that it still allows
for “imprisonment not more than 5 (five) years and fine not more than SAR
5 million.”204 The inclusion of creditors into the affairs of the debtor is
arguably a huge step.
VI. Territorialist Successes in Other Jurisdictions
Despite the positive international strides in the above jurisdictions,
there are many other states that have not changed much lately from their
fairly territorialist outlooks. For example, in Russia, “[i]t is common for
some trustees acting in the interests of the debtors to deliberately try to
decrease the price of the assets in order to sell them to an affiliated or a
controlling person of the debtor” and so independent experts are arguably
necessary.205 Further, “a single corporate bankruptcy may take up several
years, make thousands of people redundant and trigger losses worth
millions.”206 Also, between 2014 and 2016, Russia added “shareholders,
chair of the board, members of the board of directors, chief accountants and
beneficiary owners” as control persons that are potentially personally liable
for corporate debt.207
“In 2006, China introduced its new Enterprise Bankruptcy Law.”208
The law “expands eligibility for bankruptcy to all corporate debtors[] and
recognizes the cross-border effect of some bankruptcy cases.”209
Commentary has stated that the law is “not as comprehensive” regarding
recognition of inbound cases.210 “To date, recognition decisions by Chinese
courts are made mainly on the basis of bilateral judicial assistance
treaties[,]”211 partially because “[t]here is little guidance as to what
constitutes satisfaction of the reciprocity [alternative option] . . . .”212 While
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there have not been a lot of Chinese cross-border insolvency cases,213 it is
important to note that it “was the first law to make express provision for
cross-border insolvency” in China.214 That stated, at least one author feels
that “for the moment at least, creating a cross-border insolvency framework
may not be a high priority in the area of insolvency law in China.”215
Therefore, China is arguably exhibiting territorialist aspects through its lack
of forward motion.
Yet more surveyed countries lacked similar universalist motion. For
example, South Africa adopted the Model Law without enumerating any
countries with which to have reciprocity, effectively making it “a dead letter
. . . .”216 Japan adopted the Model Law and has subsequently become one of
the only countries that grants pre-recognition stays of collections;217 but,
Japan is plagued with issues regarding creditors not complying with
reorganizations,218 debtors not being able to stay in-charge,219 and “the
business restructuring proceedings . . . [being] structurally designed to
require creditors . . . to push uphill.”220 In South America, “[s]hareholders
continue to maintain control of the process in most jurisdictions . . .”221 and
“restructurings throughout the region continue to be set against a backdrop
of government involvement . . . .”222
VII. Conclusion
While this Comment cannot address every differing insolvency system
in the world, it is apparent that there are many different states in very
different parts of the globe that are making positive and steady strides
towards modified universalism. The recent setbacks in the U.S. are already
on the mend through decisions such as the recent Arcapita case. Both
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Australia and the U.K., however, have exhibited a recent territorialist
tendency in their insolvency regimes that does not seem to be yet reversing.
Positive strides in large jurisdictions such as Singapore and India, as
well as wealthy ones such as Iran, bespeak a very strong undercurrent of
modified universalist ideology slowly making its way around the globe.
While never completely identical to another states’ version, soft law such as
the Model Law has definitely made an impact worldwide.
In the coming years, the effects of the newly released Model
Enforcement Law and JIN Guidelines will also likely begin to be observed
in modern legal literature. Similarly, the author predicts that these fellow
soft law tools will sublimate their suggestions into more hard law
instruments and agreements. For the foregoing reasons, it is readily apparent
that modified universalism is thriving as the 2010’s become the 2020’s.
This, itself, proves the world moves ever closer to a universalist global
insolvency outlook. The future likely holds many new cooperative and
innovative restructuring endeavors as the rules of the game continue to
solidify and become more ubiquitous.

